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Treasury securities as part of its Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) program. While the SFP, OMOs, and programs such as TARP were not aimed directly at dislocations in short-term money markets, they did impact the supply of Treasury securities available to be financed by money markets.
In general, greater amounts of available Treasury collateral should lead to higher Treasury repo rates, however while all Treasury collateral can be used as high quality repo collateral, it does not necessarily follow that it will be. Our findings strongly support the idea that the propensity for any given Treasury obligation to support repo market activity differs systematically by source.
All Treasury securities are of equal quality as collateral, and yet each program we study had different transmission channels, different initiation periods, and different patterns of changes in supply, so that each program's relative impact on the over-night Treasury GC repo market can be identified. Thus this paper contributes to the collective understanding of short-term money markets and hereby seeks to inform policy responses to future crises.
In addition to studying the effects of Treasury collateral supply on collateralized funding rates, this study is related to other work on short-term money markets as well as to other studies examining the impact of various programs which were introduced over the course of [2007] [2008] [2009] to address the multiple dislocations in financial markets. 2 One unique aspect of our study is that we examine both monetary and fiscal policy responses 2 For a sample of such studies, see Gagnon et. al. (2010) and Neely (2010) for studies on the Large Scale Asset Purchase program; Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni (2010) for a discussion of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility; Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010) and Fleming and Klagge (2010) for an examination of the Federal Reserve's foreign exchange swap lines; and Taylor and Williams (2009) and McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) for opposing views on the impact of the Term Auction Facility.
simultaneously. Our results also highlight the need to carefully consider the interaction between various policies which will often impact areas beyond their intended targets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background on secured funding markets, the various policy responses to the financial crisis that involved Treasury debt and relevant literature; Section 3 describes our data and method; regression results are presented in Section 4; Section 5 concludes.
Background
Secured funding markets allow for collateralized borrowing by participants. In these markets, the most common type of transaction is a repurchase agreement, or repo. In a repo, a sale of securities is combined with an agreement to repurchase the same securities at a later date, typically at a higher price (representing an interest rate paid to the lender of the cash -or buyer of the security, from the borrower of the cash -or lender of the security). The lender of funds takes possession of the borrower's securities over the term of the loan and can resell them in the event of a borrower default.
Volume in the repo market is primarily then a function of demand for funds (borrowers interest in transactions) and their asset position (borrowers capacity to engage). The latter is subject to market valuation of collateral and thus possible -liquidity spirals‖ as illustrated in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) repo rates tend to track rates on uncollateralized overnight federal fund loans; the spread between the overnight GC repo rate and the fed funds target rate typically being less than 10 basis points (bps). This reflects the use of GC repos as a mechanism for lending and borrowing money. In recent years, primary dealers have used repos to finance around $2-5 trillion in fixed-income securities.
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As a general rule, there should be a positive relationship between the supply of collateral and the interest rate that the borrower must pay to obtain funds (this is because scarce collateral is more valuable, so the borrower needs to pay less interest to borrow funds). 5 In fact, a body of literature on specialness and segmentation has evolved along with the repo market itself, both as narrowly defined with Duffie (1996), Jordan and Jordan (1997) and Fleming and Garbade (2004, 2007) , and broadly to generic bond market demand and supply as seen in Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) . Moreover, demand for particular bonds as collateral is a function of their liquidity, such that -on the run‖ issues (the latest issues) hold premium collateral status, as documented in Keane (1996) and Longstaff (2004).
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)
The TSLF was introduced on March 11, 2008 -to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral and thus to foster the functioning of financial markets more generally.‖ 6 As the financial crisis progressed, funding markets came under unprecedented stress; liquidity and counter-party concerns led many money market participants to seek out Treasury securities, and term funding became scarce. As a result, Treasury overnight GC was in high demand causing its rates to plunge and the spread between the fed funds target rate and Treasury GC repo rates (as well as the spread between repo rates for other collateral such as Agency debt and Treasury GC repo rates) widened to extraordinary levels as part of a flight to liquidity as seen in Figure 1 . The TSLF was specifically designed to directly address money-market stresses.
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Also worth noting, the program's policy design is uniquely elegant as it involves a security-for-security exchange and so does not expand the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. Thus there was no need to sterilize the impact of the TSLF and as a result the program was able to grow to a substantial size very quickly. As documented in Figure 2 within one month of the first TSLF auction, the facility reached $150 billion. 14 Comparing the programs in terms of sheer magnitude, note that the peak amount of Treasury collateral supplied by the SFP was more than double the peak amount supplied by the TSLF ($560 billion versus $223 billion). But while the SFP is a very effective method for quickly draining bank reserves, one drawback to the SFP as a policy instrument is that it is subject to the federal debt ceiling; as such, balances were soon 
Open Market Operations (OMO)
In this section we detail temporary and permanent Open Market Operations over the period of observation beginning first with temporary operations.
Temporary Operations
The top panel of Figure As the top panel of Figure 4 highlights, the active daily management of bank reserves via temporary OMOs by the trading desk is concentrated prior to and through the initial phases of the crisis. were all confined to be purchases under $5 billion in size.
As the crisis intensified, the Federal Reserve's balance sheet began to take on riskier assets as emergency liquidity facilities were introduced. These assets collateralized the funds provided to financial institutions via the liquidity facilities. In an effort to maintain the size of its balance sheet, the Federal Reserve began to allow its Treasury holdings to mature and to sell its holdings. These sales increased the supply of Treasury collateral available to the public. As the bottom two panels of Figure 4 reveal, the Federal Reserve sold a greater amount of its Treasury bill holdings than coupon holdings. In the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve no longer sought to maintain the size of its balance sheet and Treasury redemptions/sales were discontinued.
In March 2009, the FOMC announced that it would purchase $300 billion in longer-dated Treasury securities as part of its Large Scale Asset Purchase program (LSAP). 18 The purpose of these purchases was to -help improve conditions in private credit markets‖, not the repo market. 19 These purchases commenced later that month and were completed by the end of October 2009. By the end of the purchases, total SOMA Treasury holdings were similar to their pre-crisis levels, albeit with a different maturity composition weighted more toward coupon holdings ( Figure 5 ).
Note that within our observation period, there are only seven operations involving bill sales so it may be difficult to identify the full relationship between repo rates and changes in bills availability due to SOMA sales. By contrast, changes in SOMA's Treasury coupon holdings exhibit fuller variation dynamics in that holdings were both purchased and sold over our sample period.
Data and Methods
We analyze daily data from January 2007 through May 2010. This time frame encompasses a period pre-crisis as well as the several direct and indirect policies described in the last section: the TSLF and LSAP program, the initiation of the SFP and the rapid expansion of outstanding publicly held Treasuries from below five trillion to close to eight trillion dollars. All these data are publicly available.
Our dependent variable is the change in the spread between the overnight Treasury GC repo rate and the fed funds rate target set by the FOMC (-the spread‖, or the -FF-Repo spread‖) as documented in Figure 1 . Examining this spread rather than the change in GC repo rates accounts for the role the fed funds rate typically serves--as a ceiling for repo rates. This is because fed funds transactions are uncollateralized, and collateralized borrowing is typically less expensive. So as the fed funds target changes, repo rates also change irrespective of the level of relevant collateral. For the sub-period where the fed funds target was the range of 0-25 bps (since mid-December 2008), we set the target rate to 25 bps.
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Data for GC rates come from Bloomberg. As noted in Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2010a, b) , overnight rates are impacted by the amount of collateral available on a given day; meaning expectations and other potential sources of endogeneity are less of a concern.
The change in the rate spread is related to changes in Treasury collateral, broken into TSLF, SFP, Treasury bills, and Treasury coupon securities (notes and bonds), temporary OMOs, SOMA bills, and SOMA coupon securities (notes and bonds)
categories. 21 While all Treasury securities are eligible to serve as collateral in a Treasury GC repo, the different types of securities could have different impacts on GC rates. For example, the TSLF was targeted at and introduced during a time of great stress in funding markets when rate spreads were much wider than typical. As a result, there is 20 In an alternate specification not reported here for the sake of brevity, we employ a midpoint of 12.5 bps as the target rate in the target-range period within our data sample: December 16, 2008 -May 28, 2010 Results are essentially equivalent. 21 The TSLF auctions alternated in terms of the types of collateral which could be exchanged for Treasury securities. Previous studies (Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2010a,b) ) have examined the two types, or -schedules‖ separately. However, we are concerned only with the amount of Treasury collateral supplied, not the type of collateral withdrawn from the market, so we do not distinguish between Treasury collateral provided by the different auctions.
more scope for a large TSLF impact than if rate spreads were at typical levels (less than 10 bps). However, the SFP was initiated in the fall of 2008, when funding markets were facing unprecedented stress following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and, as noted above, the SFP at its peak actually provided more than twice the amount of Treasury collateral as the TSLF at its peak. So the SFP may impact FF-Repo spreads in ways that are similar to the TSLF though it was not directed at stresses in funding markets.
Also worth considering, bills (including SFP bills) may have more of an impact than notes and bonds. This is because previous research has shown that primary dealers purchase over 90% of CMBs and nearly 85% of 4-week Treasury bills, while the percentage for longer term Treasury securities is around 60% (Fleming, 2007) . As dealers tend to hold CMB purchases, it is likely that shorter maturity securities are more likely to be pledged as collateral in funding markets (Fleming and Rosenberg, 2007) . Also, some investors, such as money market mutual funds, need to hold down the weightedaverage-maturity of their portfolios. Therefore, they typically invest in short-term instruments such as repo or Treasury bills, but not Treasury notes and bonds. As a result, an increase in bills can divert funds away from repo markets and drive up repo rates.
This impact is separate from and in addition to the impact due to increased collateral supply, as primary dealers (the holders of securities) need to pay more to borrow funds.
On the other hand, a corresponding increase in notes and bonds will not result in a direct diversion of funds from repo markets.
As controls we include measures of stress such as the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), which measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, the Merrill Lynch Global Financial Bond index option-adjusted spread (OAS), the change in the 1 Month spread between AA financial and non-financial commercial paper combines all sub-types of collateral and then subsequently as a vector of differentiated sources of collateral. We expect the coefficients on our collateral measures will be negative such that an increase in Treasury collateral will lead to an increase in the GC rate and therefore, a decrease in the spread. However, as noted above, some sources of Treasury collateral may have a larger impact than others.
The variable X t includes the controls listed above. We employ the VIX and the other interest rate spreads as controls because they may be associated with funding 22 The year-end and year-start dummy variables are additive to the quarter-end and quarter-start dummy variables, respectively. LIBOR stands for the London Interbank Offered Rate which is a daily reference rate for inter-bank unsecured borrowing. OIS stands for Overnight Indexed Swap which is referenced to the daily federal funds rate. Taylor and Williams (2009) employ a LOIS spread as a dependent variable, however they express some concern about LIBOR validity due to the self-reported nature of rates by surveyed banks. market stress. We focus on the 1 month CP and LOIS spreads because term funding became particularly scarce as counter-party and liquidity concerns escalated. These concerns may also be reflected in overnight collateralized borrowing costs, such as the GC rate. We expect that changes in the VIX and the various interest rate spreads will be positively related to the change in the spread. Figure 4 , bottom panel). We suggest that the coefficient is likely a spurious artifact.
Results
We interpret these results broadly as follows. Given the design and structure of the program, it is likely that most, if not all, of the Treasury collateral supplied by the TSLF was employed in funding markets, while the smaller magnitude of the other collateral coefficients suggests that a smaller fraction of the collateral supplied by the SFP and other Treasury issuance was employed in funding markets as collateral.
Nevertheless, the results show that responses to the crisis which were not directly aimed at funding markets nonetheless impacted short-term money markets, suggesting that some of the added supply from these other sources reached money markets.
As regards other coefficients in the second column, we see that the OAS and LOIS spread coefficients are positive. This is consistent with flight-to-quality responses in times of stress; as stresses increase, market participants prefer to transact with high quality collateral such as Treasuries, which drives down the Treasury GC repo rate and increases the spread. The coefficient for changes in the VIX is small and not statistically significant, which may not be surprising given that this measure is related to stresses in equity markets.
The third column in Table 3 drops the Temporary Open Market Operations variable as a robustness check. None of the reported coefficients changes in terms of magnitude or statistical significance in any meaningful way.
The fourth column of Table 3 includes the lagged spread as an independent variable. The lagged spread coefficient suggests some degree of reversion so that--for example, a widening of the spread on any given day is followed by somewhat of a reduction on the following day, all else equal. Otherwise results are not dramatically different from column 2, except that the positive SOMA bills coefficient is now much larger in magnitude and also statistically significant. The TSLF and Treasury notes and bonds coefficients are still significant at the 95% confidence level or above. One control variable, the LOIS spread drops in significance but is relatively stable in terms of magnitude.
For another robustness check of the specification, given the concern in Taylor and Williams (2009) This specification represents an attempt to distinguish whether the impact of TSLF was due to its generic impact on collateral or to its implementation as the financial crisis deepened.
After interacting each policy with our proxy for market stress, we can compare the specification in column 4 to this specification (column 6), and thereby differentiate crisis from general collateral impacts as follows: The TSLF coefficient in column 4 embeds both a crisis and a general collateral impact; whereas the stand-alone TSLF coefficient in column 6 estimates just a general collateral impact, and the TSLF*(GC- The TSLF interaction coefficient (-.0311) suggests that increases in Treasury collateral due to TSLF have more of an impact with greater stress in funding markets. In other words, the interaction coefficient shows that the TSLF was very effective in accomplishing its goal; the program was targeted at funding market stresses, and our results show that the program was most successful in reducing the FF-Repo spread during times of market stress.
<Table 4 here> Table 4 mirrors results for the same sample as in Table 3 , but with the dependent variable set as the change in the spread between the overnight Treasury GC repo rate and the effective fed funds rate. The results are very similar to the corresponding results in Table 3 , even though the effective fed funds rate is subject to different dynamics, such as the level of excess reserves in the banking system, from the overnight Treasury GC repo rate. Generally the amplitudes of coefficients and their statistical significance improve in strength when engaging the effective spread. This is particularly true for the more generic Treasury issuance and SOMA bills. Table 5 compares the results for the full period with results over two sub-periods, an early and later crisis period.
<Table 5 here>
The first three columns of Table 5 correspond to Table 3 Table 4 as the anchor specification.
These sub-period results may be of interest as the sample from January 2007 through mid-December 2008 excludes observations after the FOMC adopted a target range of 0-25 bps for the fed funds rate instead of an explicit target rate. This sample thus avoids the need to pick a target rate against which to benchmark the GC rate. Also, given the low level of interest rates, it is highly unlikely that the FF-Repo spread will be greater than 25 bps, so that any increases in repo rates may be biased downward when Values for these variables were zero over the excluded period and therefore, there is no identifying variation. We note that over all sub periods the TSLF persists in being the largest negative coefficient in magnitude and most statistically significant policy response in alleviating stresses in money markets.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the impact of Treasury collateral on overnight Treasury GC repo rates. In general we find the expected relationship, increases in
Treasury collateral increase repo rates and narrow the spread between repo rates and the fed funds target. These results are related to studies investigating the impact of Federal
Reserve emergency liquidity facilities which were introduced in response to the financial crisis that began in the fall of 2007. We find that the TSLF, which was introduced specifically to address stresses in short-term funding markets, was effective in alleviating the dislocations due to the increased demand for Treasury collateral as the crisis progressed. We also find that programs like the SFP and general Treasury issuance, which were aimed at the financial crisis but not short-term funding markets, in fact did also impact repo rates. However, we find that OMOs by the Federal Reserve (both temporary and permanent) which also impact the level of Treasury collateral, did not alleviate funding market stresses during our sample period.
These results also highlight the need to carefully consider the impact of policies beyond their intended target. For example, the SFP was primarily intended to the help drain the level of bank reserves, while LSAP purchases helped lower longer-term U.S.
interest rates. But while the SFP program reinforced the increases in Treasury collateral from TSLF, LSAP purchases of Treasury securities actually removed Treasury collateral. 
